On February 20, 2009, the Illinois Supreme Court rendered a decision in the case of Lacey v. Village of Palatine, et al. The defendant municipalities and individual police detectives were alleged to have breached their statutory duties under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986, 750 ILCS 60/305 (2004), in conjunction with their investigation of a solicitation for murder-for-hire plot conceived by the plaintiff’s decedent’s ex-boyfriend. An informant alerted police detectives to the plot in October 2004. After a thorough investigation, including notifying the plaintiff’s decedent about the plot, the police detectives determined that probable cause did not exist to arrest the ex-boyfriend and closed their investigation. Plaintiff’s decedent, who had been the recipient of an order of protection in effect during the relevant time period, was tragically killed two months later, in December 2004. Plaintiff later sued the defendant municipalities and individual police detectives asserting claims under the Domestic Violence Act for failing to prevent her decedent’s alleged murder.
The trial court had previously dismissed plaintiff’s claims, determining that the police detectives were not acting pursuant to the Domestic Violence Act during their investigation of the ex-boyfriend’s criminal conduct and that the absolute immunity provided by Sections 4-102 and 4-107 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act applied to insulate them from any liability for plaintiff’s decedent’s alleged wrongful death. On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed the trial court, finding that a question of fact existed as to whether the defendant municipalities and individual police detectives were “enforcing” the Domestic Violence Act during the relevant time period. After that adverse ruling, Querrey & Harrow successfully postured the case for further appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. Oral argument was held before the Illinois Supreme Court on November 19, 2008.
To understand the import of the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision, some background on the Illinois Domestic Violence Act is necessary. Section 304 of the Domestic Violence Act mandates that when a law enforcement officer “has reason to believe that a person has been abused, neglected or exploited . . . the officer shall immediately use all reasonable means to prevent further abuse, neglect or exploitation,” including, among other things, arresting the perpetrator where appropriate, seizing any weapons the perpetrator used to commit the abuse, neglect or exploitation, accompanying a victim to his or her place of residence and providing a victim with information and procedures on relief available. 750 ILCS 60/304 (2004). Further, Section 305 of the Act provides for limited law enforcement officer liability. That is, Section 305 makes plain that law enforcement officers can only be held liable willful and wanton violations of the Act (i.e., not adhering to the aforementioned duties) while “rendering emergency assistance or otherwise enforcing the Act.” 750 ILCS 60/305 (2004).
Importantly, the Supreme Court has now, for the first time, spoken about what it means to “otherwise enforce” the Illinois Domestic Violence Act. The Supreme Court determined that the defendant municipalities and individual police detectives were not doing so in the case at bar. Notably, the Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the Illinois Domestic Violence Act imposes upon law enforcement a generalized, open-ended and perpetual duty to protect all victims of domestic violence. The Supreme Court also clarified that the Illinois Domestic Violence Act is not implicated merely because law enforcement officers are dealing and/or interacting with a person who is the recipient of a protective order. Indeed, the Supreme Court acknowledged the insurmountable burden that would be placed on law enforcement officers if it determined to the contrary, noting that a police department’s duty is to preserve the well being of the public at large, rather than specific individuals.
Finally, the Supreme Court noted that the language of Section 304 of the Domestic Violence Act supports that an officer must be in some proximity to a domestic violence victim in order for the duties under the Act to be triggered. Again, Section 304 of the Act requires that when law enforcement officers have reason to believe a person has been abused, neglected or exploited, they shall “immediately” take reasonable steps to prevent further abuse. The Supreme Court held that each of the duties enumerated in Section 304 of the Act assumes that an officer would have direct, in-person contact with the domestic violence victim. Importantly, no such contact was present in this case, as police detectives had closed their investigation two months before plaintiff’s decedent’s death. Additionally, plaintiff made no allegations in her complaint to the effect that her decedent contacted law enforcement officials reporting any violations of the order of protection by the ex-boyfriend in that two-month time period.
The Supreme Court’s ruling has obvious implications for law enforcement officials in their interactions with domestic violence victims. Arguably, the decision could be viewed as both clarifying and narrowing the circumstances under which the Act’s duties are triggered. Attorney Jennifer Medenwald, chair of Querrey & Harrow’s appellate practice group, prepared the briefs submitted to and argued the case before the Illinois Supreme Court. Additionally, attorney Brandon Lemley is to be commended for his work in preparing the petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court and the briefs at the trial court level. Attorney Paul Rettberg was the lead attorney on the case in the trial court. Rehearing was not pursued at the Illinois Supreme Court level.
