The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois recently ruled that a former union apprentice with Adult Attention Deficit Disorder may proceed with claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). In Heater v. Local Union No. 176, IBEW, N.D. Ill., No. 07 CV 5403, 9/15/08, the Plaintiff, Heater, was a member of the Union from approximately 2002 through May of 2005, during which time she received job apprenticeship training. As part of the training she was required to take periodic tests and was ultimately terminated due to poor test scores.
In her suit, the plaintiff alleged that she suffered from Adult Attention Deficit Disorder, that the Union was aware that she suffered from the disorder and that the Union unreasonably refused to accommodate her learning deficiencies that resulted from her impairment.
In denying the motion to dismiss filed by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 176, the court indicated that the plaintiff's ADA claims were not pre-empted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 176 relied on the U.S Supreme Court case of San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, (1959), stating that "when an activity is arguably subject to §7 or §8 of the Act, the states as well as the federal courts must defer to the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted." Id.at 254.
Sections 7 and 8 of the act broadly discuss the rights of employees to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection and sets out a list of "unfair labor practices". [Pub. L. 93-360, July 26, 1974, 88 Stat. 396]. The basis of the Union's motion to dismiss was that Heater's claims actually raised unfair labor practice charges, which are covered by the NLRA. However, Judge Joan Lefkow determined that Garmon did not intend to remove all labor disputes from the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
In addition, Judge Lefkow wrote that the Garmon decision rests on the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, and stated that "while state laws can be preempted by federal laws, the federal laws generally do not pre-empt other federal laws pursuant to the Supremacy Clause." Therefore, Judge Lefkow indicated that the Union's reliance on Garmon must be in reference to federal courts in their capacity as adjudicators of state law. Hence, for the federal claims to be pre-empted by the NLRA, the claims must arguably be subject to §7 or §8 of the Act.
The court ruled that there is no conflict presented by Heater's ADA claims. The court ruled that the gravamen of Heater's complaint is not that the Union unfairly required its members to pass these tests but, rather, that it unfairly neglected to make reasonable accommodations for her disability.
In conclusion Judge Lefkow stated, "the labor issue is collateral to the claims under an independent federal remedy, and the federal court should maintain jurisdiction over the claim." As a result of this decision, employers need to be wary that claims involving the alleged "failure to accommodate" argument may not be determined by the NLRA.
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Matthew J. Daley, an associate in our Chicago office, joined us following serving as an Assistant State's Attorney for the Cook County State's Attorney’s Office. As a prosecutor, Matt tried hundreds of cases to verdict through both bench and jury trials, having prosecuted crimes in the Public Interest Bureau, Domestic Violence Division and the Sixth Municipal District. Matt concentrates his practice in the areas of Workers' Compensation, Municipal Liability, Employment & Labor and Criminal Defense.
If you have questions regarding this article, please contact Matt via mdaley@querrey.com, or via 312-540- 7000.
