Medical Malpractice Update:

Use of Independent Contractor Disclaimers in Defense of Apparent Agency Claims

The First District Appellate Court recently addressed whether a hospital could be held liable for the acts of independent-contractor physicians, when the patient signed a consent form disclosing the physicians’ status as contractors, but the patient was allegedly confused or misled by the consent form. 

In Schroeder v. Northwest Community Hospital, No. 1-05-2594, 2006 Ill. App. LEXIS 1142 (1st Dist., December 12, 2006), Charles Schroeder was admitted to Northwest Community Hospital by his primary care physician on three separate occasions for treatment of rheumatoid arthritis.  During these hospitalizations, Mr. Schroeder received treatment from his primary care physician as well as several consulting physicians.  Following Mr. Schroeder’s death, his wife brought an action against the decedent’s primary care physician, the decedent’s consulting physicians, and Northwest Community Hospital, claiming that the defendants negligently caused the decedent’s death by administering medication that was contraindicated for the decedent’s other underlying health conditions.  The complaint alleged that the named physicians were actual or apparent agents of Northwest and that Northwest was vicariously liable for their actions.

Northwest moved for summary judgment asserting that the co-defendant physicians were independent contractors and not actual or apparent agents of Northwest.  In support of its motion, Northwest relied upon three consent forms signed by either the decedent or his wife at the time of each hospital admission.  The consent forms stated in pertinent part:

Your care will be managed by your personal physician or other physicians who are not employed by Northwest Community Hospital or Northwest Community Day Surgery Center but have privileges to care for patients at this facility. Your physician's care is supported by a variety of individuals employed by Northwest Community Hospital or Northwest Community Day Surgery Center, including nurses, technicians and ancillary staff. Your physician may also decide to call in consultants who practice in other specialties and may be involved in your care.  Like your physician, those consultants have privileges to care for patients at this facility, but are not employed by Northwest Community Hospital or Northwest Community Day Surgery Center.

Upon signing this form, I acknowledge that I have read and understood the foregoing and accept its terms.

The plaintiff responded to the motion by claiming that the consent form was confusing and ambiguous because it did not clearly state that the treating physicians were not hospital employees or agents.  The plaintiff argued that the consent form could be reasonably interpreted to mean that the decedent’s personal physician was employed by Northwest but the other unidentified physicians who might be involved in his care were not. 

The plaintiff also argued that the disclosure statement was confusing because it was included among other “small print” related to release of medical records, responsibility for valuables, and assignment of insurance benefits and that Northwest made no meaningful effort to ensure that the plaintiff or decedent understood the disclosure.  The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment finding that both the plaintiff and the decedent signed the disclosure forms and there was no claim that the plaintiff was unable to read and understand the disclosure forms which were tendered to her and signed.

On appeal, the Court began its analysis by referring to the oft-cited case of Gilbert v. Sycamore Municipal Hospital, 156 Ill. 2d 511 (1993), in which the Illinois Supreme Court held that for a hospital to be liable for the negligence of a physician under the doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff must show:  (1) the hospital or its agent acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the allegedly negligent physician was an employee or agent of the hospital; (2) that the hospital had knowledge of acts of the agent which created the appearance of authority, where there were such acts, and acquiesced in them; and (3) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.  The Court noted that if there was evidence that the decedent in this case reasonably believed that his personal care physician and consulting physicians were agents or employees of the hospital, a triable issue of fact existed and the issue should have been presented to a jury. 

Based on this, the Schroeder Court reversed the trial court’s order granting the defendants summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings in the trial court.  In reaching its decision, the Court merely stated that the relevant inquiry in the case was whether the decedent was confused or misled by the disclosure forms and that there was “sufficient material evidence” on the issue of apparent agency to submit the case to the jury.  The Schroeder opinion contains no discussion or description of the material evidence that the Court relied upon in reaching its decision.

A properly worded independent contractor disclaimer may be an important tool in successfully defeating apparent agency claims either by summary judgment or at trial.  However, the Schroeder decision highlights the tendency of the courts to resolve any ambiguities in a disclaimer against the hospital.  Accordingly, appropriate steps should be taken by hospitals to utilize this simple manner of contesting allegations of apparent agency and its resulting liability exposure.  This means that hospitals should be particularly diligent in phrasing their disclaimer forms in such a way as to preclude a later claim that the form was confusing or misleading. 

Plain language and simple sentences should be used.  Legalese and compound sentences should also be avoided. If the disclaimer is included in a form with multiple paragraphs, the disclaimer should be contained in a separate paragraph and should be underscored or otherwise accentuated to avoid a later claim that the disclaimer was buried in the fine print.  Moreover, if feasible, the disclaimer should be contained on a separate form altogether. 

If the patient knows, or should have known, that the treating physician was an independent contractor, then the hospital will not be vicariously liable for the physician’s negligence.  While the existence of an independent contractor disclaimer is not always dispositive of the issue of apparent agency, an unambiguous consent form disclaiming a physician’s employment and agency can be an invaluable tool in demonstrating that the hospital disclosed the parties’ relationship to the patient and did not hold the physician out as one of its own.

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Shannon Holbrook, an Associate in our Chicago office, concentrates his practice in health care liability where he has significant experience in the defense of medical malpractice claims against hospitals, physicians, and other health care professionals.  Mr. Holbrook's experience also includes the defense of premises liability and other personal injury matters, as well as counseling hospitals and other professionals in the health care industry on the prevention of claims against them and medical charting issues.  He has also been involved in a number of state and federal appellate court decisions involving medical malpractice, personal injury, premises liability, and other professional liability claims.  If you have any questions regarding this article, please contact Shannon via
sholbrook@querrey.com.