Federal Litigation Update: Will The Pleading Standard Set Forth In The Ashcroft v. Iqbal Supreme Court Decision Significantly Alter Motions To Dismiss?

On May 18, 2009, in a 5 to 4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled held that the lawsuit filed by Javaid Iqbal, a Pakistani Muslim that was arrested during the course of the investigation into the September 11, 2001 attacks, was appropriately dismissed for failure to meet the pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 8.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, No. 07-1015 Slip Op. (2009). In doing so, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.

By way of background, Iqbal brought suit against former US Attorney General John Ashcroft and the Director of the FBI, Robert S. Mueller III, for alleged abuses he said he suffered in a Brooklyn detention center. Although the Supreme Court addressed issues of supervisory liability and jurisdiction, the Court’s decision regarding the pleading standard under FRCP 8, will have the most significant impact on federal litigation.

Under FRCP 8(a)(2), a pleading had to contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  District courts have interpreted this provision liberally and have required very little in the way of factual details that were the basis for the claim. For the most part, very general, conclusory allegations were sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment under this standard. 

Then, in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 521 S.Ct. 1955 (2007), an anti-trust matter, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that “plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”Id. at 555.  Ultimately, the factual allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”Id. at 557.  The Supreme Court in Iqbal affirmed these principles and held the Twombly pleading standard for all civil actions, not just anti-trust lawsuits. 

In concluding that Iqbal’s complaint did not satisfy this pleading standard, the Supreme Court repeatedly referenced conclusions contained within Iqbal’s complaint.  For example, Iqbal alleged that the Petitioners (Ashcroft and Mueller) “knew of, condone, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [him]” to harsh conditions of confinement “as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.”  Slip Op. at 16.  The Court found that such claims were nothing more than “formulaic recitations of the elements” of a constitutional claim.  Id. at 17.

This decision sheds some light on the application of FRCP 8 and is very favorable to defense interests. However, its application at the district court level remains to be seen.  Ultimately, each district court judge has wide latitude and discretion, but this decision will provide a significantly higher benchmark for all pleadings. Thus, motions to dismiss may be a more viable tool to dispose of lawsuits at a very early stage than they have been in the recent past. 

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Dominick Lanzito, an associate in our Chicago office, concentrates his practice in federal litigation, class action litigation, Intellectual Property, Civil RICO, and civil rights.  Prior to joining Querrey & Harrow, Mr. Lanzito served as an Assistant State’s Attorney for the Cook County State’s Attorney's Office, gaining experience in torts and civil rights litigation, as well as in criminal prosecution and criminal appeals.

If you have any questions regarding this article, please contact Dominick via  dlanzito@querrey.com, or via 312-540-7592.