The Illinois Appellate Court recently affirmed a trial court’s ruling granting a plaintiff a new trial solely as to the issues of pain and suffering and loss of a normal life damages limited to a period of six months following an accident. Specifically, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that the jury’s verdict awarding damages for medical expenses, but zero damages for pain and suffering and loss of normal life, was fatally inconsistent with the evidence presented at trial.
By way of background, plaintiff was rear ended by the defendant’s vehicle in May 1996. Plaintiff testified that she was thrust forward by the collision and the side of her head thereafter struck the headrest. Plaintiff also claimed to have experienced extreme lower back spasms, arm and shoulder pain, headaches and neck stiffness as a result of the accident.
Among other medical providers, plaintiff treated with an internist and orthopedic surgeon in relatively close proximity to the accident. Plaintiff also underwent physical therapy, consisting of massage therapy and exercises, for three months after the accident. After three months of physical therapy, plaintiff claimed that she “plateaued,” discontinued all treatment for a total of three years, and reconciled that she would just live with the pain.
In 1999, plaintiff returned to her orthopedic surgeon, reporting neck pain and tingling in her fingers. The orthopedic surgeon instructed plaintiff to do home exercises, but plaintiff testified that the pain continued. Plaintiff thereafter sought chiropractic treatment, which she continued to receive two times per week as of the time of trial.
Plaintiff testified that, before the accident, she was an active person, who engaged in aerobic exercises and sports. While plaintiff could walk and participate in low impact exercises, she testified that she could not dance, horseback ride or play tennis following the accident. Plaintiff also reported developing digestive problems and experiencing pain in her lower abdominal area beginning in 2005. One of plaintiff’s physicians testified at trial that plaintiff had been diagnosed with Crohn’s disease, which developed as a result of plaintiff taking anti-inflammatory drugs following the accident.
A medical expert for the defendant testified that, per his review of plaintiff’s orthopedic surgeon’s and physical therapist’s records, there was nothing physically wrong with plaintiff. Specifically, the defendant’s expert noted that plaintiff had good range of neck motion and no pain after the accident. The defendant’s expert also testified that the medical records revealed that by July 1996, plaintiff had made good improvement and that plaintiff had a fairly high level of functioning, taking vacations, going on amusement park rides and riding in a car for prolonged periods of time. Finally, the defendant’s expert concluded that, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, plaintiff’s soft tissue injury to her neck would have healed within approximately six months. In the defendant’s expert’s opinion, plaintiff did not suffer a herniated disc or bone fracture in her neck, but instead had degenerative arthritis.
In affirming the trial court’s decision to award a new trial as to certain elements of damages, the appellate court noted that whether to award a new trial is a matter within a trial court’s sound discretion. Further, such a determination rests upon whether a jury’s verdict was supported by the evidence. Where a jury’s findings are unreasonable and arbitrary, the appellate court noted that it is the proper course to grant a request for a new trial.
The defendant relied on the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Snover v. McGraw, 172 Ill. 2d 438 (1996), in arguing that the jury’s verdict was reasonable because plaintiff failed to establish that she had any significant, objective symptoms of injury after the accident. InSnover, however, the supreme court emphasized that, in other cases, an award of medical expenses without a corresponding award for pain and suffering might be inappropriate. Specifically, the supreme court noted that, if the evidence adduced at trial clearly indicates that a plaintiff suffered serious injury accompanied by a wealth of objective symptoms, a verdict for medical expenses alone could be inconsistent and possibly considered to be against the manifest weight of the evidence.
The appellate court ultimately distinguished plaintiff’s case from Snover, finding that the evidence at trial included objective symptoms of plaintiff’s injury. Notably, the appellate court pointed to the defendant’s expert’s opinions to the effect that plaintiff had a soft tissue injury to her neck that would have healed in approximately six months. Significantly, the defendant’s expert’s opinion in that regard was based, in part, upon objective evidence, namely, MRI films and reports. Further, defense counsel conceded during closing arguments that plaintiff had pain and suffering for a period of six months after the accident. In short, the appellate court determined that the jury was not free to disregard uncontroverted evidence of pain and suffering and loss of normal life for such a time period.
Additionally, the appellate court held that the trial court did not err in limiting the re-trial to the two subject classifications of damages for only a six-month time period. Specifically, the appellate court commented that based upon the jury’s medical expenses award, the jury obviously determined that the plaintiff suffered from a soft tissue injury for only a six-month time period, and disregarded plaintiff’s contention that her Crohn’s disease and other late onset symptoms were related to the accident. The appellate court further noted that while the trial court limited the time period that the jury was to consider on re-trial, the trial court did not set any limit on the amount of damages that could be awarded.
